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LONCHAR V. THOMAS
116 S. Ct. 1293 (1996)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On October 13, 1986, Larry Lonchar and an accomplice shot and
stabbed four members of a bookmaking operation to which Lonchar
owed money. At his trial for capital murder, Loncharrefused to cooperate
with his attorney or attend the trial, stating that "he did not have a case"
and that he wished to die.1 The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld his
conviction on mandatory appeal,2 and Lonchar's execution was sched-
uled for the week of March 23, 1990. Two days before the execution
Lonchar's sister filed a "next friend" habeas petition which was subse-
quently dismissed in both state and federal court. Lonchar's execution
was set again for February 24, 1993. Lonchar then filed his own state
habeas petition, which was dismissed when he changed his mind. When
his execution date was re-set for June 23, 1995, Lonchar's brother filed
another "next friend" petition in state court, which was quickly dis-
missed. The day of the scheduled execution Lonchar filed another state
habeas petition, alleging 22 different claims. At the same time, he told
the court that he only wanted to delay his execution in the hope that the
Georgia legislature might change the method of execution from electro-
cution to lethal injection so that Lonchar might be able to donate his
organs. When the state court dismissed the petition as an abuse of the
writ, Lonchar immediately filed his first federal habeas petition.
3
In federal district court, the State argued that Lonchar's petition
should be dismissed as an abuse of the writ because he had waited six
years to seek relief, had twice waited until the day of his execution to file
his petition, and had admitted that he sought relief not to vindicate his
rights, but only to delay his execution. Although the district court
essentially agreed with these contentions, it ruled that Habeas Corpus
Rule 9,4 and the cases interpreting it, were the sole authority for
dismissing a federal petition based on abuse of the writ. Because the Rule
provides for dismissal only of "second or successive" petitions, not of a
first petition, the district court declined to dismiss Lonchar's petition and
granted a stay of execution to permit time to consider the petition.
5
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the stay the
next day on the grounds that "equitable principles" independent of Rule
I Lonchar v. State, 369 S.E.2d 749, 752 (Ga. 1988).
2 Id.
3 Lonchar v. Thomas, 116 S. Ct. 1293, 1295-96 (1996).
4 Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b) reads, in relevant part, "A second or
successive petition maybe dismissed if... the judge finds that the failure
of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an
abuse of the writ." Note also that part (a) of the Rule allows courts to
dismiss even a firstpetition which was so delayed thatit causedprejudice
to the state. In this case, the government did not attempt to invoke this
part of the Rule by establishing prejudice.
5 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1296.
6 Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d 590, 593 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
7 503 U.S. 653 (1992) (Timing of a filing relevant to decision
whether to grant equitable relief).
8 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1296, 1302-03.
9 Habeas Corpus Rule 4.
10 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1297.
11 Note that the Court has also recently decided a case which seems
to reciprocate to the state the rights granted the defendant in Lonchar.
9 granted courts the authority to dismiss "abusive" habeas petitions.6 In
so holding, the appellate court relied heavily on the United States
Supreme Court'spercuriam opinion in Gomezv. United StatesDist.Court
for Northern Dist. Of Cal.
7
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
held: 1) If a court cannot dismiss a petition on the merits, it cannot achieve
the same result by vacating a stay and allowing the case to be mooted by
the petitioner's execution, and 2) a court may not dismiss a first federal
habeas petition on "equitable" grounds not encompassed by Habeas
Corpus Rule 9, and thereby ignore the Rules, statutes, and established
habeas precedent.
8
ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Stay Must Be Granted to Avoid Mootness
A district court may dismiss even a first habeas petition immedi-
ately if "it plainly appears from the face of the petition... that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court."9 However, if the
petitioner's claims are substantial enough to avoid dismissal under this
standard, as they were in Lonchar, the district court's discretion is
severely constrained when dealing with an initial federal habeas petition.
When considering a request for a stay of execution to consider a first
federal habeas petition, "if the district court cannot dismiss the petition
on the merits before the scheduled execution, it is obligated to address the
merits and must issue a stay to prevent the case from becoming moot." 10
Accordingly, a court must grant a stay whenever a first habeas petition
cannot be dismissed on the merits, even if it is filed at the "eleventh
hour." 11 This ruling upholds and slightly extends the Court's earlier
ruling in Barefoot v. Estelle,12 which held that where the petitioner has
obtained a certificate of probable cause on his initial habeas petition and
a stay of execution is necessary to prevent the petition from becoming
moot by the death of the petitioner, a stay must be granted. Here, "if the
The Supreme Court held in Calderon v. Moore, 116 S.Ct. 2066 (1996)
that the state's appeal of a habeas petition cannot be dismissed as moot
simply because the state has complied with the federal district court's
order granting a new trial. Charles Edward Moore, Jr. had successfully
petitioned the district court for habeas relief based on a violation of his
right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
(1975). The district court ordered either his release or the grant of a new
trial within sixty days. After their motion for a stay was denied at every
level, the State appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
dismissed the appeal as moot because by that time the State had granted
Moore a new trial, though it had not yet begun. The Supreme Court, per
curiam, reversed, stating that as long as even a partial remedy remains
available to the State, the appeal is not moot. "Because a decision in the
State's favor would release it from the burden of the new trial itself, the
Court of Appeals is not prevented from granting any 'effectual relief
whatever' in the State's favor, and the case is clearly not moot." Id. at
2067 (citations omitted).
12 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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district court lacks authority to directly dispose of the petition on the
merits, it would abuse its discretion by attempting to achieve the same
result indirectly by denying a stay."'
13
Although it might appear axiomatic that the state may not dispose
of a claim by disposing of the claimant, four justices disagreed with this
part of the Lonchar holding. Led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
concurrence argued that although the likelihood of the petition's success
on the merits is one factor to be considered in granting a stay,14 there are
other factors outside the Habeas Rules themselves which allow a court
to decline to grant a stay. The concurrence stated that "[u]nless the
eleventh-hour nature of the petition is taken into account, the late filing
may induce the federal court to disregard federal-state comity and
'frustrate... the States' sovereign power to punish offenders." ' '15 The
concurrence argued that the Court's opinion in Gomez v. United States
Dist. CourtforNorthern Dist. of Cal. 16 had established that "last-minute
or manipulative uses of the stay power constitute equitable grounds
which can justify the denial of an application for stay of a state court order
of execution."'17 Presumably this holding would apply even if the
petitioner had substantive claims that would be rendered moot by his
death. The concurrence's position suggests that the subjective motiva-
tion of the petitioner in filing the petition may be relevant in evaluating
motions to dismiss under Habeas Rule 9. Ironically, although the
concurring justices felt that equitable principles outside of the Rules
could be applied to deny a stay, they agreed with the majority's conclu-
sion that such equitable principles could not be used to dismiss a petition,
even though "[b]y bringing about Lonchar's execution, vacating the stay
would prevent courts from considering the petition's merits, just as
would its dismissal."
18
I. Courts Must Follow Rules, Statutes, and Precedents
The district court had found that no statute or rule specifically
authorized the dismissal of a federal habeas filing which was neither
facially invalid, successive, orprejudicial to the State. 19 Nonetheless, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, drawing its inspiration from language
in Gomez, found that because the "writ of habeas corpus is governed by
equitable principles.... the petitioner's conduct may thus disentitle him
to relief. Even when the petitioner follows procedural rules, the writ
comes at a cost to finality and state sovereignty. A petitioner's willful
delay and manipulation of the judicial system exacerbate this cost."20
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that Lonchar's actions in
waiting until the last possible moment to file his petition constituted
"abusive conduct" and vacated the district court's stay of execution.
21
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that "the fact that the writ has
been called an 'equitable' remedy does not authorize a court to ignore
[the] body of statutes, rules, and precedents" which have evolved into
traditional habeas law.22 The majority stressed that "the arguments
13 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1297 (1996).
14 Id. at 1304.
15 Id. at 1305 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Engle v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982)).
16 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
17 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1305.
18 Id. at 1296.
19 Id.
20 Lonchar v. Thomas, 58 F.3d at 592 (1lth Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
21 Id. at 593.
22 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1298 (1996) (citations omitted).
against ad hoc departure from settled rules would seem particularly
strong when dismissal of a first habeas petition is at issue. Dismissal of
a first federal habeas petition is a particularly serious matter, for that
dismissal denies the petitioner the protections of the Great Writ entirely,
risking injury to an important interest in human liberty. '23 The Court
pointed out that the Rules give lower courts substantial discretion in
dealing with habeas petitions, including dismissal of facially invalid
claims, expedited review, and dismissal on various procedural grounds.
Most importantly, "a specific federal Habeas Corpus Rule, Rule 9(a),
directly addresses the primary factor-delay-that led the Court of
Appeals to dismiss the petition for 'equitable reasons.' 24 Because the
conditions of the Rule were not met (no finding of prejudice to the state),
the appellate court had no authority to invent a new "equitable" rule to
allow it to dismiss the petition. The choices embodied in the Rules must
be respected, regardless of whether the particular court agrees with their
application under a specific set of circumstances. It would be institution-
ally inappropriate to "amend[ ] the Rule, in effect, through an ad hoc
judicial exception, rather than through congressional legislation or
through the formal rulemaking process.
'25
The majority also took exception to the interpretation of Gomez
given by both the court of appeals and the concurrence. The Court
pointed out that the petitioner in Gomez was not a first-time habeas
filer-he had filed four previous petitions. Technically, Gomez was not
even a habeas case-the petitioner brought the action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Rather, the language relied upon by the court of appeals to the
effect that a "court may consider the last-minute nature of an application
to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief' 26 was in
fact simply the Court stating that the abuse of the writ doctrine would also
apply to the § 1983 action, because it was the petitioner's attempt to
circumvent the habeas rules barring successive petitions. As the Court
pointed out, "Gomez did not, and did not purport to, work a significant
change in the law applicable to the dismissal of first habeas petitions.
'27
Similarly, the fact that Lonchar's motive for filing his federal
habeas petition was simply to delay his execution makes no difference.
Courts should "not look behind an action that states a valid legal claim
on its face in order to try to determine the comparative weight a litigant
places on various subjective reasons for bringing the claim."
'28
Nor does it matter, in the case of a first federal habeas claim, that the
action is brought at the last minute. Although successive claims might be
barred, "the interest in permitting federal habeas review of a first petition
is quite strong. And, given the importance of a first federal habeas
petition, it is particularly important that any rule that would deprive
inmates of all access to the writ should be both clear and fair."'29 It was
in the interest of this faimess and clarity that the Court found that ad hoc
equitable considerations outside the framework of the Rules should not
be used to dismiss a first federal habeas claim.
30
23 Id. at 1299 (emphasis in original).
24 Id. at 1300.
25 Id. at 1301.
26 Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. Of Cal.,
503 U.S. at 654 (1992).
27 Lonchar, 116 S. Ct. at 1301.
28 Id. at 1303.
29 Id. at 1302.
30 Id. at 1303.
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M. Impact in Virginia
Because of the imposition of the new federal habeas rules under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,3 1 it is not clear what
impact, if any, this decision will have on habeas cases litigated under the
new regime. The Act puts such strict time limits on the filing of habeas
31 Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
32 For an in-depth discussion of the ramifications of the new law,
see Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus Under the
corpus petitions that future petitioners will almost certainly be unable to
replicate the actions of Lonchar. 32 The holding of the case may prove
useful, however, to counsel who, in other contexts, are facing the
dismissal of their case on supposedly "equitable" grounds.
Summary and analysis by:
Daryl L. Rice
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Capital De-
fense Journal, this issue.
FELKER v. TURPIN
116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On November 23, 1981, Ellis Wayne Felker met Joy Ludlam, a
cocktail waitress. He induced her to visit him the next day by offering her
a job at a business he claimed to own. Ms. Ludlam was found dead in a
creek some two weeks later. The medical examiner reported she had been
beaten, raped, sodomized, and then strangled. Hair and other incriminat-
ing fiber evidence linked the victim to Felker. In addition, a witness
placed the victim's car at Felker's home the day she disappeared. 1
Felker, who was on parole for rape at the time of the murder, was
convicted of capital murder, rape, aggravated sodomy, and false impris-
onment and was sentenced to death on the capital murder charge. His
conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the
Supreme Court of Georgia,2 and the United States Supreme Court denied
his petition for certiorari.3 The state trial court denied collateral relief,
the Supreme Court of Georgia refused to issue a certificate of probable
cause to appeal the denial, and the United States Supreme Court again
denied certiorari.
4
Felker then filed his first federal habeas petition, alleging five
substantive claims, 5 but the district court denied the petition and the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial.6 Felker then filed
a second state petition a few days before his scheduled execution, which
was denied. On May 2,1996, the week of his scheduled execution, Felker
filed for a stay of execution and a motion for leave to file a second federal
habeas petition. He sought to raise two new claims: the first that the voir
1 Felker v. State, 314 S.E.2d 621, 627-628 (Ga. 1984).
2 Id. at 649.
3 Felker v. Georgia, 469 U.S. 873 (1984).
4 Felker v. Zant, 502 U.S. 1064 (1992).
5 Felker's claims were: (1) that the state's evidence was insufficient
to convict him; (2) that the state withheld exculpatory evidence; (3) that
there was ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing; (4) that the state
improperly used hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory; and (5) that the
state violated the double jeopardy clause by using Felker's 1976 convic-
tion as evidence at trial. Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2336 (1996).
dire and jury instructions had been constitutionally invalid, and the
second that new forensic evidence "so discredited the State's testimony
at trial that petitioner had a colorable claim of factual innocence."7
Between Felker's first and second federal habeas petitions the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (ATEDA) 8 had
been signed into law. The court of appeals thereafter held that Felker's
second petition did not meet the requirements of the Act, nor would it
have met pre-Act requirements. The court of appeals therefore denied
both motions.9 Felker then filed what he styled a "Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, for Appellate or Certiorari Review of the Decision of the
United States Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit, and for Stay of
Execution." 10 The Supreme Court granted the stay and certiorari,
limiting briefing to three issues: (1) the extent to which the provisions of
ATEDA apply to an original petition for habeas corpus filed in the
Supreme Court, (2) whether application of ATEDA suspended the writ
of habeas corpus in this case, and (3) whether Title I of ATEDA,
especially § 106(b)(3)(E), constitutes an unconstitutional restriction on
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.11
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court held, first, that although Title I
does impose new restrictions on the Supreme Court's authority to grant
relief, it did not repeal their authority to entertain original habeas
petitions. 12 Second, the Court held that Section 106(b)'s "gatekeeping"
6 Felker v. Thomas, 52 F.3d 907 (1995).
7 Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. at 2337.
8 Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,
2253-54,2261-66).
9 Felker v. Turpin, 83 F.3d 1303 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
10 Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. at 2337.
11 Id.
12 Id.
